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Correspondence
Valuation of Goodwill
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: In the October, 1921, issue of The Journal of Accountancy,
the author of Valuation of Goodwill says on page 263:
“In valuing the goodwill of Tiffany & Co. the court approved a multiple
of ten years’ purchase {Matter of Moore, 97 New York, 238). This case
was decided as recently as 1916 and represents probably the maximum
valuation which has been approved by the courts.”
The citation, 97 N. Y., 238, indicates a case in the 97th volume of the
New York court of appeals reports, the present number of which is 234.
If the citation is correct, it is obvious that the case is not so recent as
1916; if incorrect, readers interested in the legal opinion may experience
some difficulty in finding it. As a matter of fact, the citation should have
read 97 Miscellaneous (N. Y.), 238, a set of volumes containing reports
of cases tried in courts of record of New York other than the court of
appeals and the appellate division. The case in question was tried in the
surrogate’s court of New York county before Surrogate Fowler, who wrote
at page 240:
“If six years’ purchase of the average annual net profits was con
sidered not an unreasonable value of the goodwill in a case where the
question of goodwill related to the name under which a number of
candy stores are conducted (Von Au v. Magenheimer, 126 A. D., 257),
it would seem that the goodwill of a company having the prominence,
the permanency and the established reputation of Tiffany & Co. should
be worth at least ten years’ purchase of the annual net profits.”
Within the month Surrogate Schulz of Bronx county wrote an inter
esting opinion in regard to the estate of James A. Bolton, copy of which,
clipped from the New York Law Journal, is enclosed.
In closing, I would call to your attention a comment made by Cuthbert
W. Pound, judge of the court of appeals of New York, in an address
which is printed in Cornell Law Quarterly, February, 1923:
“Instruction in business administration, corporate finance, accounting
and kindred subjects is almost as essential in connection with a law
school course as are the moot trials and practice courts.”
Yours very truly,
New York, June 19,1923.
W. B. Wiegand.
[enclosure]
surrogate’s COURT—(BRONX COUNTY)—CHAMBERS
By Schulz, S.
Estate of James A. Bolton—The executors of the decedent’s last will
appeal from the order fixing the amount of tax upon the transfer of his
property pursuant to the terms thereof. They contend that the appraiser
erroneously failed to deduct the value of the widow’s dower before making
such appraisal. The decedent made certain provisions for his wife, and
with respect to them stated that they “are made and are to be accepted by
her in lieu of dower in my estate.” Upon the argument it was agreed that
for the purpose of this appeal it might be assumed that the widow has
accepted the provisions thus made instead of insisting upon her dower. The
appraiser was correct in not making an allowance for the widow’s dower
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under these circumstances (Matter of Gould, 156 A. D., 423; Matter of
Reimann, 42 Misc., 648; In re Barbey’s Estate, 114 N. Y. S., 725; Matter
of Stuyvesant, 72 Misc., 295; Matter of Taylor, N. Y. L. J., May 26, 1923).
The second ground of appeal is that the appraiser’s valuation of 200 shares
of the stock of a corporation which had been owned by the decedent is
excessive. The stock was not listed, no sales appear to have been made,
and the appraiser in fixing its value attempted to follow the method now
generally adopted and sanctioned by the authorities when dealing with stock
of this kind. This consists of adding to the value of the net assets of the
corporation the value of the goodwill of its business and dividing the result
by the number of shares of stock into which the capital is divided (Matter
of Jones, 172 N. Y., 575; Matter of Rees, 208 N. Y., 590, affirming order of
surrogate without opinion). In arriving at the value of the assets he has
added the sum of $408,728.77 surplus. This amount, however, had already
been included in the calculation of assets and hence has been appraised
twice. In ascertaining the value of the goodwill the approved method is
to obtain the average yearly net profit extending over a period of years
after deducting interest at 6 per cent. on the amount of capital invested
each year (Matter of Seaich, 170 A. D., 686, aff’d 219 N. Y., 634; Matter
of Ball, 161 A. D., 79; Matter of Silkman, 121 A. D., 202, aff’d 190 N. Y.,
560; Von Au v. Magenheimer, 115 A. D., 84, 126 A. D., 257, aff’d 196
N. Y., 510), and then to take a number of years’ purchase of the balance.
There is no hard and fast rule as to the number of years of which an
average shall be obtained, nor as to the number of years’ purchase that
shall be taken (see cases cited in Matter of McMullen, 92 Misc., 637).
In each instance the particular circumstances must be considered. In the
present matter the appraiser has taken the average net profits for the
years 1915 to 1921, inclusive, deducted 6 per cent. interest on what he
claims is capital invested and taken a three-year purchase of the balance
then remaining, and thus reached his valuation of the goodwill. During
the years 1916 to 1919, inclusive, the profits of the corporation were
extraordinarily large due to the world war. Thus the average profits for
the five years 1910-1914, inclusive, were $35,674.68, while the average
profits for the next five years, 1915-1919, exclusive, were $149,210.66. In
the affidavit of the president of the corporation the reason for these large
profits is stated, and his explanation is not in any way controverted or
impeached. To base the appraisal of the goodwill upon an average for
a period of seven years where four of the seven years have been so
unprecedentedly profitable does not appear to me to result in a fair
valuation, which is the end sought to be attained (Matter of Ball, supra).
A more equitable result would be obtained if the profits for the years
1910 to 1921, inclusive, were taken as a basis for the average per annum
profit and a three years’ purchase of that result obtained, and the appraiser
is directed to so proceed. It also appears that the appraiser has deducted
interest on only two items of capital. Interest on the whole capital which
is invested in each of the years of which the average is taken should be
deducted from the profits of that year. The decedent in his will nomi
nated two executors and gave a legacy to each, providing, however, that
such legacies were in lieu of the commissions of such executors. It is
correctly urged by the appellants that the appraiser erred in failing to
allow any deduction for executors’ commissions. The statute provides that
“the excess in value of the property so bequeathed * * * above the
amount of commissions * * * prescribed by law in similar cases shall
be taxable,” and allowance should therefore have been made (Tax L.,
1909, chap. 62; Cons. L., chap. 60, sec. 226; Matter of Silliman, 79 A. D.,
98, aff’d 175 N. Y., 513). I am also of the opinion that the appraiser
should have deducted the widow’s exemption of $150, as contended for by
the appellants, before fixing the value of the estate for purposes of
taxation (Matter of Libolt, 102 A. D., 29). For the reasons stated the
order is reversed and the matter remitted to the appraiser to proceed as
indicated.
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